We propose different approaches of PDF files based steganography, essentially based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Here, after a cover PDF document has been released from unnecessary characters of ASCII code A0, a secret message is hidden in it using one of the proposed approaches, making it invisible to common PDF readers, and the file is then transmitted through a non-secure communication channel. Where each of our methods, tries to ensure the condition that the number of inserted A0 is less than the number of characters of the secret message s.
Introduction
Steganography consists in hiding a secret message in public document acting as a covert, in a way that sent through a non-secure communication channel, only the sender and the receiver are able to understand it, and anyone else cannot distinguish the existence of an hidden message. It is one of the Information hiding techniques as showed on figure 1, where Linguistic Steganography is defined by Chapman et al [1] as, "the art of using written natural language to conceal secret messages", and Technical Steganography is defined as a structure rather than a text, that can be represented by any physical means such as invisible inks, microdots [1] . Most of the work in steganography has been done on images, video clips, music, sounds and texts. But, Figure 1 : Classification of information hiding techniques text steganography is the most complex, due to the lack of redundant information in text files, whereas lot of redundancy is present in image or sound files, leading to a high exploitation of those files in steganography [2] . There are several approaches encountered in the literature regarding the text steganography such as, line shift, word shift, syntactic methods, etc. Subsequently we focused on the steganography based on PDF files.
PDF files based Steganography
PDF, created by Adobe Systems [3] for document exchange, is a fixed-layout format for representing documents in a manner independent of the application software, hardware, and operation system. PDF files are frequently used nowadays and this fact makes it possible to use them as cover documents in information hiding. Studies using these files as cover media, are very few. Our proposal is based on the work of I-Shi et al. [6] , in which secret data are embedded at between-word or between-character locations in a PDF file, by using the non-breaking space with American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) code A0. I-Shi et al. [6] found in their study that, the non-breaking space (A0 ) is a character when embedded in a string of text characters, becomes invisible in the windows of several versions of common PDF readers, and use that phenomenon for data hiding. They showed two types of invisibility, based on the ASCII code A0.
The first one is created by specifying the width of A0 appearing in the PDF reader's window to be the same as that of the original white-space represented by the ASCII code 20. The width of an ASCII code, is the width of the character represented by the code as displayed in a PDF reader's window. Subsequently, A0 and 20 become white-spaces. Their approach based on this first type of invisibility called alternative space coding, uses A0 and 20 in a PDF text alternatively as a between-word space to encode a message bit b according to the following binary coding technique: if b = 1; then replace 20 between two words by A0 ; if b = 0; make no change.
This approach has the advantage of incurring no increase of the PDF file size because it just replaces the space exhibited by the code 20 by another exhibited by the code A0. However, if the between-word locations in a PDF page are few, then only a small number of bits may be embedded.
The second one is created by setting the width of the ASCII code A0 to be zero in a PDF page. They found in their study an A0 doesn't appear in a PDF reader's window just like if it was nonexistent. Their approach called null space coding, given a message character C, embeds it at a location L as follows:
if the index of C as specified in Table 1 is m, then embed m consecutive A0's at location L.
In this approach they presented, Table 1 [6] contains ASCII codes selected for message representations in their study, each one indexed with an integer value.
The advantage of this approach is that the number of between-character locations are higher than the between-word locations. This makes the efficiency of the null space coding much higher. But an obvious disadvantage is that the resulting PDF file size will be higher than the original one (the one without A0's embedded in it).
Our work is based on this last type of invisibility described by I-Shi et al., such that our problematic is to reduce the weight difference between the cover PDF file and the stego PDF file resulting from the embedding process, while increasing the embedding capacity of the cover PDF file. In order to reduce considerably the risks of detecting a cover communication based on the file size.
Our Contribution
Given a secret message s to be conceal in a cover text message, the null space coding developed by I-Shi et al., proceeds as follows:
• Firstly, s is compressed using the Huffman coding, where at the end a file, containing a table where each line has a letter of s followed by a value, is generated;
• Secondly, for each character of s a number of A0's is inserted in the cover text equivalent to the value generated by the Huffman coding for that character, thus producing a stegotext.
• Thirdly, the file and the stegotext are transmitted through a non-secure communication channel. We note that two files (the file containing Huffman codes for the characters of the secret message and the PDF file resulting from the embedding method) are transmitted.
Their method cannot guarantee that the number of embedded A0's is less than the number of characters of s or at least if s grows higher, the number of inserted A0's won't explode.
Our aim is to propose different approaches, based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem, which their goal is to attain the above conditions and transmit one and only one file (more precisely only the stegotext), through a non-secure communication channel.
Chinese Remainder Theorem
be a pairwise relatively prime family of positive integers, and let a 1 , ..., a k be arbitrary integers. Then there exists a solution x ∈ Z to the system of congruence
solution to this system of congruence if and only if
Given a i and n i , (1 ≤ i ≤ k), we present the classic method of construction of x from a i and n i as follows:
We first construct integers e i , (1 ≤ i ≤ k), such that for i, j = 1, · · · , k, we have:
Then setting
a i e i Allows to see that for j = 1, · · · , k we have
As all the terms in this sum are zero modulo n j , except for the term i = j, which is congruent to a j mod n j . To construct e i , (1 ≤ i ≤ k), satisfying (1), let us define b i = N/n i , which is the product of all the moduli n j with j = i. Then, c i and e i are defined as follows:
Garner's algorithm is an efficient method for determining x, 0 ≤ a < N, given a(x) = (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a k ), the residues of x modulo the pairwise co-prime moduli n 1 , n 2 , ..., n k [9] .
Garner's algorithm for CRT [9] Input: a positive integer M = 1. For i from 2 to t do the following:
Time Complexity: O(n 2 ) This theorem is highly useful in a many contexts as, randomized primality test, modular arithmetic, secret sharing, etc.
Preprocessing on the cover file
The PDF file f ∈ F , that would be used as cover, needs to be cleansed of all A0's contained in it. Meaning, going from the beginning of the file to its end, if we cross a A0 with size different from 0, we replace it by a space character (ASCII code 20), and if we cross a A0 of size 0, we remove it, as presented by the following function. Input: f: cover PDF file Output: f: cover PDF file with no sequence of more than one A0 Where, sizeof (A0) is a function that retrieves the width of the nonbreaking space character, if exists, set in a cover PDF file f .
The reason why we apply this procedure on a cover PDF file, is to ensure that the file has not been modified by a steganographic technique based on ASCII code A0; and also, as A0 by default has the width of the space character, it can be replaced by it, all this to avoid ambiguity between A0 inserted by our techniques and those found initially in the cover file.
Presentation of the different approaches
For the sender and the receiver to be able to communicate through a nonsecure channel, they have to agree on a secret key that would be use to encrypt a secret message, that would be send one to another. Regarding our approaches, the key k ∈ N, represents the number of bits (block length) in which a secret message s ∈ {0, 1} * would be split into before its encoding. And it's previously selected by the sender and the receiver and shared through a secure channel. Subsequently |s| denotes the length of the string s.
First Approach

Hiding method
We denote s the secret message, an integer k a secret key and f a cover PDF file. Without loss of generality, we assume that the length of s is a multiple of k. The first approach proceeds as follows: Input: s: secret message; k: secret key; f: cover PDF file. Output: f: cover PDF file with embedded A0 's
Step 1: two co-primes p 1 , p 2 , are computed from k such that,
Step 2: s is split in n blocks of length k stored the matrix sp such that:
Step 3: each line of sp corresponding to a binary sequence, is transformed in its decimal value dec[i] such that,
Step 4:
Step 5: each r[j, i], (1 ≤ j ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n), obtained from the previous step is transformed in its binary value stored in a matrix binr bit by bit, such that:
⌉ bits of length.
Step 6: Add a column at binr, the number of columns would then move from ⌈ k 2 ⌉ to (1 + ⌈ k 2 ⌉); and for each line add a control bit at the end as shown by the following:
Step 7: each line of binr is embedded in a cover PDF file f , as described by the following: 
Get the first between-character location
. Get the next between-character location lc end;
The control bit is there to help, during the recovery procedure, to know when to stop looking for embedded blocks in the cover file. Time Complexity: O(n * k)
Recovery method
To recover secret message from a stego PDF file encoded with the above procedure, the binary sequences encoded with A0's in the file must be recover at first, then remainders that produced those sequences, and with the k, computer the values related to those remainders, as described by the following procedure: Input: f: stego-PDF file, k: secret key Output: s: secret message
Step 1:two co-primes p 1 , p 2 , are computed from k such that,
Step 2: retrieve the different lines of binr as follows: Step 3: remove from binr the (1 + ⌈ k 2
⌉)
th column, corresponding to the control bit's column.
Step 4: compute each r[j, i], (1 ≤ j ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n) from each line of binr such that:
Step 5: compute each dec[i], 1 ≤ i ≤ n) using Garner's algorithm such that:
Step 6:
Step 7: merge all the binary string into one, the secret s, such that:
Where GarnerAlgorithm take as input a list of co-primes p 1 , p 2 , a list of remainders r[1, i], r [2, i] , and outputs a unique value dec[i]. Time Complexity: O(n * k)
Evaluation
In this approach, for each block of length k, 2 remainders r 1 , r 2 are computed respectively from p 1 and p 2 . As p 1 < p 2 , we can easily deduce that, the number max of inserted A0's from a remainder is:
Thus, the number max of A0's that can be inserted for a block of s is k.
So, to embed a full secret message s divided into n blocks of length k, the maximum number of A0's that would be needed is:
We add 1 here because, for the last computed remainder, a A0 character would be inserted at the end of the hiding procedure, serving as ending point for the recovery method. From, all these comes out the following theorem.
Theorem 2 .
Given a secret message s, a secret key k such that number of blocks of length k, is given by n = |s| k , and two primes
s insertions at between-character locations to perform in a PDF file, is:
Where N depends on the number of bits having value 1, contained in the secret message s's computed remainders.
Second Approach 6.2.1 Hiding method
In this particular approach, what would be considered as key is not k the block length, but m, a value that allows to compute primes between 2 × m and 3 × m, such that the base 2 logarithm of the product of all those primes gives us the block length k, in which a secret message s would be divided in. Those primes allows us to compute remainders, which their values would be used to compute position where one A0 would inserted. The whole procedure is defined as follows: Input: s: secret message, m: secret key, f: cover PDF file Output: f: stego-PDF file
Step 1: compute primes p 1 , p 2 , · · · p t such that:
where, t is the number of primes computed between 2 × m and 3 × m.
Step 2: compute the block length k such that:
Step 3: s is split in n blocks of length k stored the matrix sp such that:
Step 4: each line of sp corresponding to a binary sequence, is transformed in its decimal value dec[i] such that,
Step 5:
Step 6: for each remainder r[j, i], 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, we compute positions pos [1, 1] , · · · , pos[t, n], as described by the following procedure:
l := l + h; 2.3. i := i + 1; end;
Step 7: sort the vector pos in the ascending order;
Step 8 th between-character location of f , insert two A0's, to mark then end of the process. Time Complexity: O(n * k)
Recovery method
To recover secret message from a stego PDF file encoded with the above procedure, the positions of all the A0's in the file must be recover at first, then remainders that produced those positions, and with the k, computer the values related to those remainders, as described by the following procedure: Input: f: stego-PDF file, m: secret key Output: s: secret message
Step 3: compute the block length in the file f such that:
Step 4: retrieve the positions where A0's have been inserted as described below: 
l := l + h; end;
Step 6: Compute each decimal value dec[i] of a block of s such that:
Step 7: transform each dec[i] in its binary sequence sp[i, j], (1 ≤ j ≤ k) bits such that:
Step 8: merge all the binary string into one, the secret s, such that:
Where GarnerAlgorithm take as input a list of co-primes
Evaluation
Let:
• ϑ(x) = p≤x, p prime ln(p),
• π(x) the number of prime numbers less or equal to x,
• p 1 , p 2 , · · · p t are the prime numbers taken between 2m and 3m.
In this approach, for each block of length k, t A0's are inserted in the cover file. So to embed a full secret message s divided into n blocks of length k, tn A0's would be needed. This is the result we obtained, resume by the following theorem. Regardless the number of blocks we need to embed, an additional A0, would be added to allow the recovery method to stop when all the hidden bits have been recovered. 
⌉. The number N of A0's insertions at between-character locations, to perform in a PDF file is given by:
On one hand, as t is the number of primes taken between 2m and 3m,
And from the work of Hadamard and de la Vallée Poussin [10] , which resulted in the following theorem:
The Prime Number Theorem [10] :
Let π(n) denote the the number of primes among 1, 2, · · · , n. Then,
We can deduce that:
On the other hand, from estimations of Rosser and Schoenfeld [11] , we have:
), f or 41 < x
It is easy to show that ∀x ∈ R, x ≥ e 5 we have:
From these estimations, we deduce that, for x ≥ e 5 :
2 10
x ≤ ϑ(3x) − ϑ(2x) ≤ 17 10
x.
Thus, putting m = x:
From (2) and (3), we can deduce the following corollary. Step 1: two co-primes p 1 , p 2 , are computed from k such that,
Step 4 
l := l + h; 2.3. i := i + 1; end;
Step 6: sort the vector pos in the ascending order;
Step 7 th between-character location of f , insert two A0's, to mark then end of the process. Time Complexity: O(n * k)
Recovery method
Input: f: stego-PDF file, k: secret key Output: s: secret message
Step 2: compute the block length in the file f such that:
Step 3: retrieve the positions where A0's have been inserted as described below: 
l := l + h; end;
Step 5: Compute each decimal value dec[i] of a block of s such that:
Step 6: transform each dec[i] in its binary sequence sp[i, j], (1 ≤ j ≤ k) bits such that:
Time Complexity: O(n * k)
Evaluation
In this approach, for each block of length k, 2 A0's are inserted in the cover file. So to embed a full secret message s divided into n blocks of length k, 2n A0's would be needed. Regardless the number of blocks we need to embed, an additional A0, would be added to allow the recovery method to stop when all the hidden bits have been recovered. The obtained result is resumed by the following theorem. 
Fourth Approach
In this particular approach, there is no need of a secret key. Here, we embed only 3 A0's, at 3 different positions in the cover file f . Their values, depend only on length of the secret message that a sender wants to send through a non-secure communication channel.
Hiding method
Input: s: secret message; f: cover PDF file. Output: f: cover PDF file with embedded A0 's
Step 1: compute n, the length of the secret message s.
Step 2: insert one A0 at the n th between-character location in the file f .
Step 3: compute two co-primes p 1 , p 2 such that,
Step 4: transform s in its decimal value dec such that,
(n−i) .
Step 5: compute two remainders r [1] and r [2] such that,
Step 6 Step 7: embed one A0 at pos [1] th and pos [2] th between-character locations in the file f . Time Complexity: O(n)
Recovery method
Input: f: stego-PDF file, Output: s: secret message
Step 1: browse the stego-PDF file, until we cross the first A0, and store its position in n.
Step 2: compute two co-primes p 1 , p 2 such that,
Step 3: browse the stego-PDF file, from the position n, until we cross the second A0, store its position in pos [1] and the last A0, and store its position in pos [2] .
Step 4 Step 6: Compute the decimal value dec such that:
Step 7: transform dec in its binary sequence s on n bits length such that:
Time Complexity: O(n)
Evaluation
As with this method, we have the possibility to embed not more or less than 3 A0's, no matter how long the message is, we've reached the following result. 
The proof of this theorem is trivial, regarding the definition of the hiding method.
Experimental results
We conducted experiments on our approaches to make sure we reach our goal, which is to reduce the insertion of A0 ′ s in a PDF file, to maintain a small difference between cover and stego PDF files, while increasing the amount of data that can be hidden in that PDF file serving as cover.
To have a better view of our results, we've chosen as inputs the following: secret message s = "This is a covert communication method." (as in [6] ), with nchar = 38 characters and a random PDF file. For that input I Shi et al. inserted 247A0
′ s in a pdf file. As described by the following table. Note: C is Character, F is Frequency, N is the number of A0's for a character and B is Bits. Table 1 : Number of A0's inserted with the method of I Shi et al.
C F N F*N
Regarding our methods, at the beginning we preprocessed the cover file, converted the secret message into its binary sequence, where each character was replaced by its ASCII code binary representation. As we have 38 characters each represented on 8 bits, we would have 304 bits to hide in the cover PDF file. Let's assume |s|, the total number of bits and bin the binary sequence of the secret message s. LF 0A  00001010  20  00100000  T  54  01010100  a  61  01100001  c  63  01100011  d  64  01100100  e  65 Table 3 : Number of A0's inserted.
C H ASCII Code
In the column B, for each character we computed the number of bits having value 1 in its ASCII code, multiplied by the its frequency in the secret message s. Thus, one can see that:
• We've obtained a better result compare to results obtained with the method of I Shi et al.: N < 247 A0's
• We ensured the fact that the number of inserted A0's is lower than the number of bits of s: N < |s|.
Note that the value 136 represents the maximum number of A0's that can be inserted in a cover PDF file, given the secret message taken as example in this study.
Second approach
To compute the number N of inserted A0's, we use the Corollary 1, by replacing |s| by its value and k by its equation (3) . Thus:
And as the number of A0's depends on m, we vary the value of m to see where its optimal value stands. Here are some of the obtained results:
In this approach, the block length k is not the secret key, but is computed from m which is. And even the set of prime numbers used to compute remainders is generated from it. Table 4 : Number of A0's (N = n * t), given the number of primes t and number of blocks n, both obtained from m By varying the different values of m, we came up we a certain number of curves. This curve shows the growth of t with respect to k (or m). We can see that, the more k grows, the more the number of prime numbers that would used in the computation of A0's grows. And as each prime generates one A0, the number of A0's grows too.
Then, we generated a curve, showing that, the more k gets closed to |s|, the more n, the number of blocks, decreases until it reaches the value 1; where it remains constant no matter the value k (for k < |s|).
After having computed for each value of m, the block length k, the number of primes t and the number of block n of the secret message s, we generated One can see that, when k gets superior to |s|, N the number of A0's depends now on the number of primes t. Meaning that, the more t grows the more the N grows. Where t's growth is a consequence of the growth of s, as shown by the first curve.
And for a value of k taken between 1 and |s|, the value of fluctuate, making it difficult to choose the right value of the key m, that lowers the number of inserted A0's. But compare to the result of I Shi et al. for a value of k ∈ [1, |s|], the max value (this is when k = 1) is less than the half of value (247A0's) they've obtained.
Also, one can see that the optimal value of N can be reached for k ∈ [ 1 4 |s|, 3 4 |s|]. For that, N < |s|, and there are certain cases (k ∈ [92, 102] and, k ∈ [182, 222]) where N gets lower than the number of characters of the secret message s, which is hard to generalize.
Third approach
To compute the number N of inserted A0's, we use the Theorem 3, where :
And as the number of A0's depends on k, we vary the value of k to see where its optimal value stands. Here are some of the obtained results: From the above operations, whose some of the results are represented by the figure below, we can see that:
Which is not a good situation;
• For k = 3, N = 205 < 247 A0 ′ s and N < |s|. Meaning, from here we inserted less A0's than with the method of I Shi et al.;
• For k ≥ 16, N < 247 A0 ′ s and N < |s|. From this point, N starts to get lower than the number of characters of s. As for k = 16, we have N = 39, which is exactly the number of Characters contained in s. • For k ≥ |s|, N = 3. N remains constant no matter the value of the k.
So, to ensure that a minimum number of A0's would be inserted in a cover PDF file, the sender and the receiver, should agree on a secret key with high value.
Fourth approach
First of all, compute the two remainders p 1 , p 2 that would help us to compute positions.
Then, convert the bin in its decimal value dec and compute three positions where one A0 would be inserted in the PDF. Those positions are: Whatever the values of the computed positions, only 3 A0 ′ s will be inserted. One can conclude that:
• The weight difference between the cover file and the stego file is 3 bytes;
• The number N of inserted A0's is far smaller than the number inserted using I Shi et al. method;
• We ensured the fact that the N ≤ |s|.
We can resume our results, for the chosen secret message of 38 characters, as shown by the following With these experiments we've shown the effectiveness and the correctness of our approaches.
Discussion
From the our results obtained, expressed in the previous section, we came up with some observations, regarding the choice of a secret key, to embed a secret message s, in a cover PDF file.
The number of signs that can be contained in a document page is closed to 1500. Where a sign can be, space, punctuation, apostrophes, etc. Thus, the number of between-character locations in that page is close to 1500 (2 10 < 1500 < 2 11 ). It implies that:
• In the first and fourth approaches: for each p i multiple of 1500, that is to say that p i = 1500 * α (α ≥ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2), we would need α page(s) to hide the number of A0's generated by p i .
• In the second and third approaches: h = t × p t , where h is the number of between character locations used to hide A0's generated by t prime numbers, and t in the third approach equals 2. for h multiple 1500, that is to say that h = 1500 * α (α ≥ 1), we would need α pages to hide a block of the secret message s.
Thereby, the more h or p i is high, the more we would need a cover PDF file with a high number of pages to embed our secret message. And here, the amount of embbedable information would depend on the approach selected for the purpose. Our approaches can be optimized even more, by using a compression algorithm on the secret message as done in [6] .
The advantage of our method is that it would be difficult to detect the integration of secret information in the cover file, while the inconvenient is that the file's number of pages can grow exponentially as it depends on h or p i .
Conclusion
A novel approach of PDF steganogaphy is proposed based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. In this paper we presented four different techniques whose purpose is to increase the amount of information that can be hidden in a cover PDF file, while reducing considerably the number of A0's insertions at between-character locations in that file, thus reducing the weight difference between a cover file and a stego file in which a secret message is embedded. We did this, by ensuring that the number of embedded A0's would be less than the number of characters of s or at least if s grows higher, the number of inserted A0's won't explode. Experimental results show the feasibility of the proposed methods and parameters to attain an optimal efficiency had been exposed. Further researches may be directed to improve these methods, and also to applying the data hiding scheme to other applications like watermarking for copyright protection, authentication of PDF files, etc.
